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I—ALAN MILLAR
WHY KNOWLEDGE MATTERS
An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or
not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to
know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way.
In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be
successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An
upshot is that although knowledge matters because truth matters this
should not be understood to mean that knowledge matters because true be-
lief matters.
I
Suppose that you are inquiring into whether something is so. Your
aim is to find out whether it is so. Since finding out is nothing less
than coming to know, what you aim for is knowledge.1 It is obvi-
ously compatible with this that you aim at the truth, but, I shall ar-
gue, it is important that aiming at the truth just is aiming at
knowledge. For the aim is to grasp the truth, and knowledge is the
form that such grasping takes if the aim is achieved.
(Henceforth when I speak simply of inquiry I shall be referring
only to inquiry into whether something is so. Likewise, my talk of
inquirers is about those pursuing inquiry of this form. I do not sug-
gest that it is the only form that inquiry can take.2)
Inquirers sometimes have to settle for less than knowledge due to
limitations of time and other resources, or paucity of evidence that
is available or likely to become so. If they know in advance that
1 This is not universally accepted. Stephen Grimm (2009, p. 245) equates finding out the
truth with believing the truth. Absent theoretical pressures discussed in this article I doubt
that this would look like a plausible equation. Finding out that p has the same force as dis-
covering that p. One finds out that p only if the truth that p is disclosed to one. It is not dis-
closed to one in Gettier situations (Gettier 1963) because in those situations one lacks the
kind of cognitive purchase on the thing believed that one has when the truth is disclosed to
one.
2 For a succinct discussion of the forms inquiry can take, see Hookway (1990, pp. 151–4).
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their inquiry will be thus limited can we say that they are aiming at
knowledge? The claim I am pressing is only that if the inquiry is
genuinely into whether such-and-such is so then the aim is find out
and thus come to know the right answer. We need to distinguish be-
tween projects and aspirations. Projects aim to answer specific ques-
tions. If they are well designed and seriously pursued then there will
be a realistic prospect of doing so. Projects can be motivated by as-
pirations to answer certain overarching questions, though they are
directed only at finding answers to intermediate questions in the
hope that they may be steps on the way to answering those over-
arching questions. The intermediate projects aim at knowledge, al-
beit knowledge that falls short of satisfying the aspiration.
In the face of reflections on limitations we should not lose sight of
the fact that in the various routine inquiries of everyday life many
things are found out. I find out by taste that there is insufficient salt
in the pasta or that the coffee is too weak. I find out by looking that
it is raining, or that most of the seed on the bird table has gone, or
that crocuses are beginning to appear. In these cases perceiving that
something is so establishes that it is so. Testimony can often settle
that something is so. It can be that when a colleague phones you to
say that the visiting speaker has arrived you have thereby learned—
come to know—that she has arrived. (Imagine, after taking the call,
saying to someone only that there is evidence that supports rather
strongly the claim that the speaker has arrived.) As I conceive cases
like this, your being told that something is so does more than merely
give some support for the truth of the thing told; it clinches the mat-
ter in a sense that entails that this thing would have been told to you
only if it were true. That is part of the explanation for how it is
knowledge that you gain from the testimony. There is work for the-
orists to explain how a recipient of testimony can be in a position to
treat an act of telling as clinching that the thing told is true, but as I
approach the epistemology of testimony there being such acts of
telling is a datum to be accommodated and understood rather than
a problematic hypothesis.3
Taken in one way there is no puzzle about why it should be that
inquiry aims at knowledge, since that is what inquiry is all about.
Even so, philosophical tradition urges us to consider why it should
3 I work towards an explanation in Millar (2010a, 2010b). There is a strand in epistemo-
logical tradition that links knowledge to having evidence that does more than merely lend
strong support. See Dretske (1971), McDowell (1982) and Travis (2005).
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be that knowledge is the goal of inquiry, rather than some state fall-
ing short of knowledge but implicating true belief. Granted that in-
quiry aims at the truth, what is so good about grasping the truth in
the way one does when one knows? That is a question to which I
seek a plausible answer. I have deliberately avoided posing the ques-
tion to be addressed in a way that presupposes that aiming at truth
should be conceived as aiming at true belief. Part of what I shall ar-
gue (in §iii) is that this is the wrong way to think of the matter.
II
Through his representation of Socrates in Meno, Plato provides a
way of articulating the problem. If you know which is the road to
Larissa you will be a good guide to anyone wishing to take that
road, but Socrates poses this question: ‘If a man judges correctly
which is the road, though he has never been there and doesn’t know
it, will he not also guide others aright?’ (Meno 97b; trans. Guthrie
1956). It seems to be agreed between Socrates and Meno that this
question calls for an affirmative answer. Why then is knowledge to
be prized above correct (true) opinion?
One might take the message of this stretch of conversation to be
that from a practical point of view knowledge and true belief are on
a par.4 However, as the discussion proceeds it becomes clear that
only a more limited conclusion is reached—that the man who does
not know will be just as good a guide as one who knows so long as
he retains the correct opinion (Meno 97b–c). He might for all that
not be as good a guide. We want a good guide not only to be right
but also to be steadfast. This man’s correct opinion might too easily
be dislodged by his own reflections, or promptings by others. As
Socrates comments,
True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they
stay in their place; but they will not stay long. They run away from a
man’s mind so that they are not worth much until you tether them by
working out the reason. … Once they are tied down, they become
knowledge, and are stable. (Meno 97e–98a)
4 Jonathan Kvanvig (2003, p. x) claims that ‘Socrates defends the view that true belief
works just as well for practical purposes as does knowledge’. Compare Greco (2009,
pp. 313–14).
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Socrates would have done better to say that true opinions might not
stay long, since even if they are mere true beliefs it is possible that
they should remain in place for want of anything to disturb them.
Whether or not they do depends on various contingencies. The
point that matters is that mere true beliefs are susceptible to being
undermined because our own reflections and our social interactions
might easily throw up challenges to them, or doubts concerning
them. Coming to think we have no reason to think some belief true
is liable to undermine it or lessen the firmness with which we hold
it.5 Suppose that I am the man on the road to Larissa and believe
that I am on that road. As I go along the road I might start to won-
der why I am so confident that I am on the right road. Perhaps I
have no idea why I think that it is the right road. This would be un-
usual but not impossible. Or perhaps I was told that it is the right
road by what seemed like a reliable informant and now someone
has persuasively cast doubt on that informant’s reliability. In those
situations I do not know what to think. I could persist along the
road and hope to arrive at Larissa, or I could make further inquir-
ies. But as things are I don’t know that this is the right road and I
now know that I don’t know. If I am rational, I will not even believe
that it is, since I am aware that I lack any good reason to do so.
Contrast this with a situation in which I clearly remember taking
this road to Larissa last year. If in this situation the question were to
arise as to why I take it to be the right road I could readily answer
that I went to Larissa by this very road last year. The fact that I did
so, which I have retained in memory, gives me a reason to believe
that it is the right road. By the same token it gives me reason to be
circumspect about any putative counter-evidence that might come to
my attention. Indeed, clearly remembering that I took this very road
before, it should and probably would take a lot to persuade me oth-
erwise.
If we interpret Plato’s metaphor of tethering in terms of having a
relatively stable grasp of the truth, then Socrates’ response seems to
be heading in the right direction.6 We should beware of thinking
that highlighting the importance of stability commits us to explain-
ing why knowledge matters solely in terms of its utility, whether
5 This is not to deny that when beliefs have some satisfying psychological effect they might
be hard to dislodge even if there is no strong reason to think them true.
6 For a similar, sympathetic reaction to Socrates’ response, see Williamson (2000, pp. 78–9).
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practical or theoretical.7 Stability of belief is clearly useful: if beliefs
are to be useful they need to be available to be exploited when the
need arises; they cannot be exploited if they have slipped away. But
this is only a part of the story. I shall argue that knowledge matters
because it is internal to a concern for the truth that it is not fully sat-
isfied by anything less than knowledge. So it is not just useful to
have knowledge. If we are concerned as to whether or not this or
that is so, for whatever reason, it is good to have knowledge on the
matter in question just because it is good to have the truth on that
matter, which is not the same as to say that it is good to have knowl-
edge on the matter in question just because it is good to have a true
belief as to the matter. (See, further, §iii.) The following considera-
tions are pertinent.
(i) Those concerned as to whether something is so naturally want,
and have good reason to want, more than a mere fleeting grasp of
the truth of the matter; having reached the truth they want a secure
grasp of it for at least so long as their concern lasts. That is simply
because if their true belief slips away then their concern is no longer
satisfied. Edward Craig suggests that stabilization of true beliefs is
not always important since ‘many beliefs are required for the guid-
ance of single, “one-off” actions under circumstances which will not
recur’ (Craig 1990, p. 7). This is surely right, but the claim to defend
should be only that stability of belief matters so long as the truth of
the matter in hand matters. Wondering whether there is cheese in the
fridge that can be offered to friends this evening, I look and see that
there is plenty. In the circumstances nobody is going to alter that
state of affairs before the cheese is to be served. So, given the point of
my inquiry, it matters that, until this evening when I serve the cheese,
I should retain my belief that there is enough in the fridge, and not
have to check repeatedly to see whether there is. Beyond this evening
it might well not matter whether there was cheese in the fridge in the
period leading up to the evening, and so it might not matter whether
I recall whether there was. The importance of stability is not im-
pugned by the fact that many true beliefs will not need to be exploit-
ed after a certain point that might not be far off. Our concern as to
the truth rightly aspires to a grasp of the truth that is as stable as the
concern requires. Though the example I have just given is one in
7 Duncan Pritchard (2010, ch. 1, §2) takes Plato’s response to the problem of why knowl-
edge is to be prized above mere true belief to be in terms of the practical value of knowledge.
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which the concern for the truth is motivated by practical considera-
tions, this motivation is not essential to the main point, which is that
a concern as to whether something is so, for whatever reason, is sat-
isfied only by a stable enough grasp of the truth.
(ii) Those concerned as to whether something is so have good rea-
son to want to be able to tell whether their inquiry into the matter
has been successful. An inquiry is a task and agents who intend to
carry out a task need to be able to tell when it has been completed.
When the task is to grasp the truth as to whether or not something is
so, inquirers need to know that they have done that. How are they
to do that if not by telling that they know the truth? The reflective
element here is crucial—not just knowing but knowing that we
know.8 Anything less than knowing the truth will not enable us to
tell that we have grasped the truth—that we know it. Paradigm cas-
es are provided by perceptual knowledge. Are my keys on the tele-
phone table, where I regularly, but not invariably, keep them while
at home? I look at the table and see, and thereby know, that they
are. Not only do I recognize my keys as my keys, I recognize my
keys as my keys seen by me. So with seeing that they are there comes
knowing that I see that they are there.9 The significance of reflective
knowledge is that my inquiry does not merely cease with the fixa-
tion of a belief as to the location of the keys. It ceases because I
know that the matter is settled—the truth grasped. By contrast, with
respect to a mere true belief, by definition, I have no reason to think
it true and it comes with nothing else that makes sense of how the
matter in hand can be settled. The same applies to a mere justified
true belief, as that is, to my mind rather oddly, conceived in the
framework of mainstream epistemology. Even if I knew that I had,
in the operative sense, a justified belief that something is so this
would not give me a basis for taking it to be settled that it is so
since, for all I know, I might be in a Gettier situation—one in which
I do not know but have a true belief that is, in the relevant sense,
8 Donald Davidson has written as follows: ‘We know many things, and will learn more;
what we will never know for certain is which of the things we believe are true. Since it is nei-
ther visible as a target, nor recognizable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a
goal’ (Davidson 2005, p. 6). I can see no reason to deny that I can know for certain that I
know where my keys are.
9 Epistemology needs an account of how this can be so. I present such an account in Millar
(2010b). It is as a component in a broader account of perceptual knowledge that gives a cru-
cial role to recognitional abilities. I have previously invoked such abilities in Millar (2007,
2008a, 2008b. 2009b).
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justified. If I am in such a situation I might be able to tell that my be-
lief is justified in the operative sense, but that would fall well short
of settling it that what I believe is true. (For more on this sense of
‘justified’, see §iii below.) Plausibly then, it is not just knowledge on
the matter in hand that I am after; it is knowledge accompanied by
knowledge that I know—reflective knowledge by which I not only
cease inquiry but know it to have been successfully completed be-
cause I have found out what I wanted to find out. It is not a routine
task to extend such considerations beyond the scope of perceptual
knowledge. This is something that merits close consideration.10
Among other things we need to make sense of the difference, for
someone with the right abilities, between, for instance, telling that
deer have passed from tracks on a path and, in the absence of
tracks, believing that deer will probably have passed because one
knows they usually would have by now. The trained gamekeeper
can establish from the presence of tracks that deer have passed and
know that he has. He cannot do so on the basis of the deer’s custom-
ary routine. Similarly, there is a difference between knowing that a
family member has arrived at her destination because she phones to
tell you she has, and having some degree of confidence that she has
because her means of travel were unlikely to have been delayed. The
latter consideration does not settle the matter; the phone call might
do so.
The upshot of (i) is that its relative stability contributes to ex-
plaining why knowledge matters, not just because stability is useful,
but also because, without stability that matches the longevity of our
concern for the truth, that concern is not satisfied, irrespective of
whatever else grasping the truth enables one to do. The upshot of
(ii) is that it is unsurprising that inquiry whether something is so
aims at knowledge whether it is so because (a) being reflective
agents, inquirers have reason to want to be able to tell whether their
inquiry has been successfully completed, and (b) only gaining the
knowledge sought enables them to know that they have grasped the
truth of the matter.11 It is not an implication of this view that neces-
sarily, if you know then you know that you know. If you know that
p but lack knowledge that you know that p then you will not be in a
10 For steps in this direction, see Millar(2010b); for a shorter overview, see Millar (2011a).
11 My emphasis on the importance, for an understanding of why knowledge matters, of
reflective access to what enables us to know has affinities with Ward Jones’s influential
1997 article. 
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position to reap the inquiry-related benefits that can come from
your knowing that p. It is part of the view that knowledge is no
mere aspiration. We often have it and know that we have it, which
is why we can so often responsibly terminate our inquiries and re-
sponsibly vouch for the truth of what we have found out. For all
that, we might have less of it than some epistemologist’s think. Of-
ten the best that we can hope to achieve are theories more or less
well supported by evidence, but not established as true.
It might be suggested that there are ways in which a mere true be-
lief that something is so could be stable, and satisfy our concern for
the truth, without being tied in the way suggested to reflective
knowledge. Perhaps it is possible to manipulate a person’s psycholo-
gy so that he or she comes to believe something and will continue to
believe it no matter what. If the belief were true then such a person
would have a belief as stable as any that is tied to knowledge; it
would be tethered but not through knowledge. My response is im-
plicit in what has already been said. The issue is why grasping the
truth, by way of satisfying a concern to know something, would ide-
ally take the form of knowledge, and indeed reflective knowledge.
The worry about non-rational fixation can be addressed simply by
reiterating the observation already made (under (ii)) to the effect
that inquirers aim at more than just the fixation of belief; they aim
to be able to tell that their inquiry has been successfully
completed—the truth grasped. A non-rational fixation is not the
kind of thing from which one can tell that an inquiry has been suc-
cessfully completed.
The message so far, then, is that knowledge matters for inquirers
because only knowledge satisfies their concern for truth. This is not
to deny that due to some contingency an individual’s knowledge of
something might be fleeting. Jonathan Kvanvig says that ‘knowl-
edge, no less than true beliefs, can be lost’ (Kvanvig 2003, p. 13). It
is true that knowledge can be lost. Among other things it can be lost
through forgetting. But when comparing knowing something with
the corresponding merely true belief we should take these condi-
tions to be on a par with respect to the degree to which they are
available for exploitation and resistant to erosion through forget-
ting. Screening out such factors it seems to me to remain plausible
that, barring odd contingencies, reflective agents who know that
they know whether something is so and who retain a concern as to
the truth of the matter, are better placed to hold on to the truth in
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question than one who has the counterpart mere true belief. It is not
an implication of the account that necessarily, every case of know-
ing something is more stable than would be the corresponding state
of mere true belief.12
III
It seems entirely natural to take knowledge be the goal of inquiry.
Why then has this idea not figured more prominently in epistemolo-
gy? One reason is that it has been assumed that truth is the goal of
inquiry and that we can make sense of that in terms of the idea that
true belief is the goal of inquiry, leaving open how knowledge fits
into the picture. I shall return to this presently. Another reason is
that viewing knowledge as the goal of inquiry has been thought to
be theoretically unhelpful. Here is Marian David:
Invocation of the truth-goal serves primarily a theoretical need, a need
that arises from the overall structure of epistemology. The knowledge-
goal would not serve this need. As far as epistemology is concerned,
the knowledge-goal is theoretically impotent. (David 2001, p. 153)
The background idea is here is that the theory of knowledge should
provide an account of what knowledge is in terms of true belief and
justified belief and, moreover, can best do so by bringing out the re-
lation between true belief and justified belief. The theoretical need
that David takes the truth-goal to serve is that of enabling us to shed
light on ‘a connection between the concept of justification and the
concept of true belief, tying together the different ingredients of
knowledge’ (David 2001, p. 154). The connection is, roughly, that
beliefs are evaluated with respect to justification because they are to
be evaluated ‘relative to the standard, or goal, of believing truth and
avoiding error’ (David 2001, p. 154). Against this background
David says that the knowledge-goal ‘does not fit into this picture in
12 Kvanvig (2003, pp. 15–18) also claims that knowledge can be lost in cases in which there
is an unknown defeater that undermines subjects’ knowledge but does not touch the truth
of the corresponding beliefs. He describes a case in which someone is supposed to lose
mathematical knowledge since, unknown to him, a famous mathematician incorrectly tes-
tifies that the proposition in question is false. It is open to question whether this is a case in
which knowledge is lost. But, even if knowledge can be lost in this way, instances are surely
rare. Retaining knowledge, as much as gaining it, depends on the environment being such
that certain circumstances do not obtain or obtain only very rarely.
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any helpful manner’ because it does not ‘provide an independent an-
chor for understanding epistemic concepts’ (David 2001, p. 154).
The problem, more specifically, is that ‘any attempt to understand
justification relative to the knowledge-goal would invert the explan-
atory direction and would make the whole approach circular and
entirely unilluminating’ (David 2001, p. 154). By David’s lights, and
those of mainstream epistemology, since knowledge is to be ex-
plained in terms of justification it would be circular to explain justi-
fication in terms of knowledge.
Contrasted with David’s view is a view that I favour and take to
be more solidly supported. Timothy Williamson articulates it when
he says that ‘justification is primarily a status which knowledge can
confer on beliefs that look good in its light’ (Williamson 2000, p. 9).
Though this is liable to seem bizarre from a perspective on which it
is assumed that knowledge is to be explained in terms of justifica-
tion it is nonetheless a very natural, commonsense view. What looks
like a justification for thinking that something is so, given what we
take to be the relevant facts, collapses if we find that our conclusion
depends essentially on some falsehood that we had taken for a
fact.13 It fails to establish the conclusion if it is shown to depend on
a putative fact that is challenged and we lack adequate reason to
think that we know it for a fact. In this latter situation it is not set-
tled what are the facts, and so what had been taken to be the facts
do not provide a sound basis for the conclusion in question. When it
13 Peter Klein (2008) thinks that we can acquire knowledge relying essentially on false
assumptions. A case in point, he thinks, is coming to know you have an appointment on
Monday on the basis of a false assumption that your secretary told you on Friday that you
have such an appointment. The thing is that your secretary did tell you that you had an
appointment on Monday but she did not do so on Friday. It seems to me that this is either
not a case of gaining knowledge or it is a case of gaining knowledge but not in a way that
relies essentially on a false assumption. Let’s suppose that you believe that your secretary
told you that you have an appointment on Monday, this being a straightforward entailment
of something that ex hypothesi you believe. If you would still have believed this on learning
that she did not tell you on Friday, then your belief that you have an appointment on Mon-
day is not essentially based on the false assumption that the secretary told you on Friday
that you have this appointment. It’s your recalling her telling you that is doing both the
causal and justificatory work. In that case it could be that you gain knowledge from what
you were told. Klein points out that there is no guarantee that if you gave up the belief that
the secretary told you on Friday you would still believe that she told you. Suppose that you
would not. If that were so I see no reason to suppose that you gained knowledge that you
have the appointment on Monday. You have a basis adequate for knowledge only if you are
moved by the assumption that the secretary told you that you had this appointment. But if
your only reason for holding this assumption were bound up with believing falsely that she
told you on Friday then you had no good reason to believe that she told you at all and so no
good reason to believe that you have an appointment on Monday.
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is so clear that anything less than known facts do not provide a solid
ground for accepting conclusions, why should epistemologists have
worked with a conception of justification that represents justifica-
tion as coming from less than known facts? One factor has un-
doubtedly been the attractiveness of providing an account of
knowledge in terms of justified belief and other conditions—an ac-
count that would be reductive in that the explanans would not im-
plicate the concept of knowledge. Added to this is the idea,
prompted by Gettier cases, that we can be justified in believing
things on the basis of false assumptions or on the basis of merely
seeming to see that something is so. The traditional reductive-ana-
lytical project strikes me as being hopeless, but there is something
right about the idea that the subject in Gettier cases has, in some
sense, a justified belief. A belief can be, let us say, reasonable in a
sense that implies that in the circumstances it is understandably and
blamelessly held even though based on false assumptions or on
seeming to see that something is so. But there is a difference between
being justified in the sense of being reasonable and being well
grounded and in that stronger sense justified. Beliefs based on false
assumptions or seemings to see are, in a perfectly natural sense, not
well grounded even if they are reasonable. Moreover, the natural or-
der of explanation is from well-groundedness to reasonableness: a
belief is reasonable if the subject’s situation is indiscriminable from
one in which he or she has a well-grounded belief.
David thinks that the knowledge-goal is theoretically impotent
but the considerations that are supposed to support this view lack
force if knowledge is explanatorily prior to justified belief.
The deep root of the problem for David, and mainstream episte-
mology generally, lies in thinking that belief is an ingredient of
knowledge and, in keeping with this, supposing that belief is the ba-
sic category in terms of which the relation to the truth that inquiry
seeks should be characterized. For with that as part of the picture it
seems natural to explicate knowledge in terms of conditions on be-
lief. We can put pressure on the view by thinking again of perceptu-
al knowledge.
I look at the bird table and see a squirrel on it. Recognizing it to
be a squirrel, I see that, and thereby know that, it is a squirrel. That
I know that it is a squirrel is explained by my seeing that it is. That I
see that it is a squirrel is explained by my exercising a perceptual-
recognitional ability that amounts to being in command of a way of
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telling (thus knowing) of certain things that they are squirrels from
the way they look. We have here an entirely natural way of account-
ing not only for how I acquire this knowledge but also for what
makes it knowledge. I acquire the knowledge via the exercise of the
recognitional ability. Exercising this ability is nothing less than com-
ing to know of something that it is a squirrel.14 What makes the
condition I come to be in knowledge is that it comes about through
the exercise of the ability. It is true that in acquiring the knowledge I
do concerning the thing at which I am looking I acquire a belief—
the belief that that is a squirrel. Plausibly, that is because necessarily
if you know that something is so you have what it takes to count as
believing that it is so. But accepting that does not commit us to re-
garding the belief as an ingredient of the knowledge and something
in terms of which knowledge must be explained. For belief might
yet be a determinable of which there are there many determinate
modes, including knowledge. Arguably it is. The claim that some-
one believes that p underdetermines the psychological state that the
person is in, since a range of states that differ in character can count
as beliefs that p. This is obvious from the fact that two people might
count as believing that p yet differ in that one believes more firmly
than the other. The present proposal is that knowing that p is simply
a way in which one can believe that p. In reflective agents this mode
of believing has potential to impact on thought and action that less-
er states implicating true belief lack. For instance, when I know that
my keys are on the table in virtue of seeing that they are, I acquire a
reason to believe that they are, constituted by the fact that I see that
they are. That reason is available to me because when I see the keys
I not only recognize them to be my keys, I recognize them to be seen
by me.15 It is from their visual appearance and that of their sur-
roundings that, thanks to being equipped with the requisite recogni-
14 The notion of exercising a recognitional ability is a success notion just like that of exer-
cising the ability to ride a bicycle. Our fallibility consists in our not always exercising such
abilities when we aspire to, not in our sometimes exercising them in gaining something less
than knowledge or in gaining false beliefs. There is a temptation to say that all abilities are
fallible in a sense that entails that they are sometimes successfully exercised and sometimes
not. This is encouraged by cases like the ability to throw a dart into the 25 ring. In Millar
(2009b) I argue that these are success rate abilities. In the sense in which recognitional abil-
ities are abilities, success rate abilities are abilities to achieve a success rate, within some
range, over a series of trials. They are exercised if and only if one does just that. The fact
that some attempts fail to hit within the 25 ring does not undermine the idea that the notion
of exercising such an ability is a success notion.
15 I explore this more fully in Millar (2011b).
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tional ability, I tell that I see that they are on the table. The upshot is
that when I know that the keys are on the table in virtue of seeing
that they are, the state of seeing, and in that way knowing, that they
are on the table can impact on my thinking in a way that a merely
true belief or a reasonable true belief cannot, since it can, and these
other states cannot, supply me with a reason to believe that my keys
are on the table—a reason that I am able to treat as a reason so to
believe.
From this perspective it looks wrong to assume without further
ado that the truth-goal should be conceived as true belief merely as
such, rather than as some more specific mode of true belief. It is un-
doubtedly the case that if knowledge whether something is so mat-
ters it is because the truth as to whether it is so matters, but that is
far short of establishing that knowledge matters because true belief
merely as such matters. It is not in dispute that if our search for the
truth on some matter is successful we shall have a true belief on it,
but it is wildly implausible to suppose that what we are after, or
should be after, if concerned as to the truth is a true belief conceived
merely as such. True belief is a state that can obtain in virtue of sat-
isfying minimal conditions for believing a truth. It can be poorly
grounded and unreasonable, fleeting and unstable. It can fail to be
bound up with a condition that enables us to know that our inquiry
has been successfully completed.
In the light of the foregoing we can see how the so-called swamp-
ing problem (Kvanvig (2003, 2009, 2010) does not arise for the the-
oretical approach I am defending. I outline a strand of the problem
that specifically concerns the value of knowledge of over true belief.
The starting point is a rather plausible claim about the value of
knowledge—that if knowledge as to whether or not something
is so is valuable to an inquirer into whether or not it is so, this
is solely because gaining the truth as to whether it is so is valu-
able to that inquirer. But gaining the truth in question consists
in acquiring a true belief. From this it follows that knowledge
whether something is so can be valuable to an inquirer into
whether it is so only because acquiring a true belief on the mat-
ter is valuable. (The value of the knowledge is parasitic on, or
derivative from, the value of the true belief.) From the latter it
follows that even if a true belief on a matter has an additional
property like being formed by a reliable process, or being justi-
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fied, its possession of that property is irrelevant to (swamped
by) the value of a true belief to an inquirer into the matter once
that true belief has been attained by the inquirer.
The problem can be seen to arise only on the assumption that gain-
ing the truth as to whether something is so just is acquiring a true
belief as to whether it is so. This is an assumption that I have been
concerned to displace. As inquirers into whether something is so, we
of course reach for the truth as to whether it is so, but what we
reach for is the grasp of the truth in which knowledge consists. For
the truth to matter to us just is for knowledge of it to matter.
I should make clear that for Kvanvig the swamping problem is
explicitly directed at accounts of the value of knowledge available
under epistemological theories that represent knowledge as true be-
lief plus the satisfaction of further conditions.16 I do not consider
here how telling the problem is against such theories and their ac-
companying accounts of the value of knowledge, but simply record
that it seems to me that once it is conceded that the value of knowl-
edge has to be explained solely in terms of the value of mere true be-
lief then the game is up.
Kvanvig also thinks that the swamping problem ‘is, at its core, a
problem about the special and unique value of knowledge over that
of its parts, rather than a problem concerning the value of knowl-
edge itself’ (Kvanvig 2010, p. 93). More fully spelled out, the prob-
lem is to be understood as concerning ‘a special truth-related, prima
facie value that [knowledge] possesses necessarily if at all’ (Kvanvig
2010, p. 94). I have no clear sense of what such a special value
might be, but say a little more about the kind of value I take knowl-
edge to have in the next section.
IV
The issue has been why knowledge whether or not something is so,
as opposed to some lesser state implicating true belief, matters to an
inquirer into whether or not this thing is so. The answer proposed is
that only knowledge satisfies the inquirer’s concern for the truth.
16 Kvanvig (2003, pp. xiii, 139) represents those theories as attempting to explain the value
of knowledge in terms of the value of its parts or constituents.
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The issue is in effect about the value of knowledge about some par-
ticular subject matter for an inquirer into that subject matter.
The value here is agent-relative in Thomas Nagel’s sense. In this
sense accepting ‘that some kind of thing has agent-relative value
commits us only to believing that someone has reason to want and
pursue it if it is related to him in the right kind of way’ (Nagel 1986,
p. 154). Our focus has been on the reason that inquirers into wheth-
er or not something is so have to seek knowledge whether or not it is
so. If possessed, the knowledge is related to the inquirer in this way:
its attainment can satisfy the agent’s concern for the truth on the
matter in question in a way that nothing else can. That confers
agent-relative value upon it. It does not follow that the knowledge
in question has agent-neutral value such that anyone has reason to
attain it. Nor even does it follow that the agent ought to acquire the
knowledge, if ‘ought’ is understood to express the upshot of deliber-
ation as to what to do (cf. Williams 1981). For the reason in ques-
tion is akin to the reason that someone who intends to do something
has to take the means necessary. This kind of reason confers a point
on, and in that way makes sense of, taking the necessary means, but
having such a reason does not entail that one ought in the delibera-
tive sense to take the necessary means.17 Perhaps one ought instead
to abandon the intention. Similarly, from the claim that attaining
knowledge that something is so would have agent-relative value for
me it does not follow that I ought to acquire it.
The account admits of a natural extension to those who are land-
ed with knowledge without looking for it. The knowledge will be of
agent-relative value to them so long as they have a concern as to the
truth of the matter. One reason why knowledge can be short-lived is
simply that the subject lacks, or comes to lack, a concern on the
matter in question.
From this perspective it remains an open question whether there
might be knowledge that has agent-neutral value such that each of
us has reason to gain or retain it. If there is such knowledge it will
matter because of its content, not simply because it is knowledge.
There are discussions of truth as an epistemic goal or epistemic
good that might convey the impression that grasp of the truth, irre-
spective of its content, has agent-neutral value. If this were so then
there would be a sense in which knowledge, irrespective of its con-
17 I discuss such reasons in Millar (2004, ch. 2; 2009a).
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tent, also has agent-neutral value. Michael Lynch (2004, pp. 15–
19), for instance, takes it to be a truism that truth is worth caring
about for its own sake.18 To motivate this he cites examples of want-
ing to know the truth on some specific matter irrespective of any
practical value that this might have. Yet in summing up his view
Lynch does not speak of caring about whether this or that specific
thing is true, but simply about caring about truth. Indeed, he takes it
to be a prima facie cognitive or epistemic good that we should be-
lieve all and only truths (Lynch 2004, pp. 46–51). (‘Prima facie’ in
this context means can be outweighed by other goods.) This sug-
gests that the good in question is agent-neutral, for it seems to imply
that we have some reason to pursue all truths irrespective of their
content and how they relate to us, albeit that this reason can be out-
weighed. In a later work Lynch modifies the claim so as to avoid the
obvious objection that it represents the good of true belief as an un-
attainable goal. It becomes the claim that ‘[i]t is prima facie good
that, relative to the propositions one might consider, one believe all
and only those that are true’ (Lynch 2009, p. 226). I cannot find a
way of interpreting this so that it looks plausible. Whether the good
in question is agent-relative or agent-neutral there is a problem of
how to make sense of what is so good about having true beliefs spe-
cifically about propositions one might consider.
We can avoid these problems while doing justice to the idea that
in some sense true belief is good belief. For it seems plausible that if
you were to have a belief as to whether or not p it would be a good
thing that it should be the belief that p if and only if p, and the belief
that not-p if and only if not-p. If this is right then agents who satisfy
a certain condition—that of having or aspiring to have a belief as to
whether or not p—have a reason to want any belief that they have
or acquire as to whether p to be true. The reason here is agent-
relative—it is a reason for agents who satisfy the condition of hav-
ing or aspiring to have a belief as to whether or not p. There is no
suggestion here that agents should be pursuing the truth on any par-
ticular matter.
My scepticism about the agent-neutral value of true belief, irre-
spective of its content, is obviously compatible with the idea that
there might be all sorts of reasons—prudential, moral and
otherwise—why agents should find out whether this or that is so. It is
18 For scepticism about such a claim, see Heal (1987–8, especially pp. 105–8).
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also compatible with the view that there are some truths that all of us,
perhaps just in virtue of being human, should grasp. The proposed
view does not touch on these matters. It is one way of trying to cap-
ture the idea that belief in some metaphorical sense aims at truth.19
In the light of the discussion in this essay should we say that belief
aims at knowledge? Perhaps not. Claims about the aim of belief
should be psychologically realistic. It seems far less clear that neces-
sarily belief is sensitive to facts and considerations bearing on
whether what is believed is known than that necessarily belief is sen-
sitive to facts and considerations bearing on whether what is be-
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